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This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important issue related to the preservation of legal claims for appeal. Parties may appeal only from "final decisions of the district courts." 28 U.S.C. § 1291. Thus the general rule is that "[a]n appeal from the final judgment brings up all antecedent issues," In re Kilgus, 811 F.2d 1112, 1115 (7th Cir. 1987), and that "all interlocutory orders are reviewable on appeal from the final decree," Gloria Steamship Co. v. Smith, 376 F.2d 46, 47 (5th Cir. 1967). "Interlocutory orders therefore may be stored up and raised at the end of the case." Kurowski v. Krajewski, 848 F.2d 767, 772 (7th Cir. 1988). Notwithstanding these precepts, the circuits have squarely divided over whether purely legal claims denied at summary judgment are reviewable on appeal after a jury trial where those claims have not been reasserted in a post-trial motion. In the decision below, the Fourth Circuit acknowledged the 8-3-1 circuit split. But the panel declared itself bound by Fourth Circuit precedent and held that it would "not review, under any standard, the pretrial denial of a motion for summary judgment after a full trial and final judgment on the merits, even in circumstances where the issue rejected on summary judgment and not reasserted in a post-trial motion is a purely legal one." That holding was outcome-determinative-the sole basis on which the court refused to consider petitioner's PLRA exhaustion defense-and this case is a perfect vehicle for resolving the widespread disagreement over this important question. The question presented is: Whether to preserve the issue for appellate review a party must reassert in a post-trial motion a purely legal issue rejected at summary judgment.

Whether a public official engages in state action subject to the First Amendment by blocking an individual from the official's personal social-media account, when the official uses the account to feature their job and communicate about job-related matters with the public, but does not do so pursuant to any governmental authority or duty.

Whether the civil-liability provisions of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., unequivocally and unambiguously waive the sovereign immunity of the United States.

Since the high-water mark in Wilder v. Virginia Hospital Association, 496 U.S. 498 (1990), this Court has consistently rebuffed efforts to find privately enforceable rights in Spending Clause statutes. Indeed, several Justices have suggested that the entire project of enforcing such rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is mistaken: Spending Clause statutes are "much in the nature of a contract," Barnes v. Gorman, 536 U.S. 181, 185-86 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted), and when Section 1983 was enacted, contracts in general-and contracts with governmental entities in particular-did not give rise to claims by third-party beneficiaries. The Seventh Circuit's decision below illustrates just how flawed this project is. Notwithstanding the Court's instructions to the contrary, see Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1, 18 (1981), and Gonzaga Univ. v. Doe, 536 U.S. 273, 289 n.7 (2002), the court of appeals relied on the appearance of the word "right" several times in the Federal Nursing Home Amendments Act of 1987 ("FNHRA") to hold that patients may use Section 1983 to second-guess garden-variety transfer and medication decisions-thereby federalizing much medical-malpractice litigation and nullifying important state medical-malpractice rules. This case presents the following questions: 1. Whether, in light of compelling historical evidence to the contrary, the Court should reexamine its holding that Spending Clause legislation gives rise to privately enforceable rights under Section 1983. 2. Whether, assuming Spending Clause statutes ever give rise to private rights enforceable via Section 1983, FNHRA's transfer and medication rules do so. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-806.html

''Nearly 80 years removed from International Shoe, it seems corporations continue to receive special jurisdictional protections in the name of the Constitution. Less clear is why." Ford Motor Co. v. Montana Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1038 (2021) (Gorsuch J., concurring). This petition seeks resolution of an issue that has divided courts around the country. More than a dozen state supreme courts and every federal court of appeals have weighed in on the question with conflicting results. An unbroken line of this Court's cases holds that a court may exercise personal jurisdiction with a party's consent. Corporations enforce that precedent to the letter in their contracts of adhesion, requiring flesh and blood consumers to litigate disputes with businesses in often-distant tribunals. E.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991). Turnabout should be fair play (and is, incidentally, consistent with substantial justice). Consistent with that rule, states have enacted laws requiring corporations operating within their boundaries to consent to personal jurisdiction when they register to do business in those states. The Pennsylvania Supreme Court found such a statute unconstitutional under this Court's decision in International Shoe v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), and its progeny. That erroneous result is but the latest decision among dozens that are squarely divided on the question presented: Whether the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a state from requiring a corporation to consent to personal jurisdiction to do business in the state. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1168.html

The federal aggravated identity theft statute provides: "Whoever, during and in relation to any felony violation enumerated [elsewhere in the statute], knowingly transfers, possesses, or uses, without lawful authority, a means of identification of another person, shall, in addition to the punishment provided for such felony, be sentenced to a term of imprisonment of 2 years." 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The question presented is whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time he mentions or otherwise recites someone else's name while committing a predicate offense. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-10.html

The Georgia Supreme Court held that a jury's verdict of acquittal on one criminal charge and its verdict of guilty on a different criminal charge arising from the same facts were logically and legally impossible to reconcile. It called the verdicts "repugnant," vacated both of them, and subsequently held that the defendant could be prosecuted a second time on both charges. Does the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment prohibit a second prosecution for a crime of which a defendant was previously acquitted?

Whether a veteran who has served two separate and distinct periods of qualifying service under the Montgomery GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3001 et seq., and under the Post- 9/11 GI Bill, 38 U.S.C. § 3301 et seq., is entitled to receive a total of 48 months of education benefits as between both programs, without first exhausting the Montgomery benefit in order to obtain the more generous Post-9/11 benefit.

Respondent VIP Products LLC markets and sells dog toys that trade on the brand recognition of famous companies such as petitioner Jack Daniel's Properties, Inc. The district court found that VIP's use of Jack Daniel's trademarks to sell poop-themed dog toys was likely to confuse consumers, infringed Jack Daniel's marks, and tarnished Jack Daniel's reputation. The Ninth Circuit, however, held that VIP's First Amendment interest in using Jack Daniel's trademarks as its own marks on funny dog toys conferred special protection from infringement claims and rendered VIP's commercial dog toys "noncommercial" and thus exempt from dilution-by-tarnishment claims. The questions presented are: I. Whether humorous use of another's trademark as one's own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act's traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection from trademark-infringement claims. 2. Whether humorous use of another's mark as one's own on a commercial product is "noncommercial" under 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C), thus barring as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-148.html

The Consolidated Decree in Arizona v. California, 547 U.S. 150 (2006), apportions the mainstream of the Colorado River in the Lower Basin ("LBCR") among three States, decrees rights to the LBCR for five Indian Reservations (but not the Navajo reservation) and various other entities, and prescribes how the Secretary of the Interior ("Secretary") shall operate the mainstream dams in satisfaction of the decreed rights and water delivery contracts entered under the Boulder Canyon Project Act ("BCPA''). The Court retained exclusive jurisdiction "for the purpose of any order, direction, or modification of the decree, or any supplementary decree, that may at any time be deemed proper in relation to the subject matter in controversy." Id. at 166-67 (emphasis added). The United States "assumes Indian trust responsibilities only to the extent it expressly accepts those responsibilities by statute," treaty, or regulation. U.S. v. Jicarilla Apache Nation, 564 U.S. 162, 176-77 (2011). The federal treaties with the Navajo Nation ("Nation") do not require the Secretary to develop a plan to secure water for the Nation; and they do not address water at all. The doctrine of implied rights to water in Winters v. United States, 426 U.S. 207 (1908) ("Winters Doctrine") cannot justify imposing such a fiduciary duty on the Secretary. The questions presented are: I. Does the Ninth Circuit Opinion, allowing the Nation to proceed with a claim to enjoin the Secretary to develop a plan to meet the Nation's water needs and manage the mainstream of the LBCR so as not to interfere with that plan, infringe upon this Court's retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the LBCR mainstream in Arizona v. California? II. Can the Nation state a cognizable claim for breach of trust consistent with this Court's holding in Jicarilla based solely on unquantified implied rights to water under the Winters Doctrine? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1484.html Whether the federal government owes the Navajo Nation an affirmative, judicially enforceable fiduciary duty to assess and address the Navajo Nation's need for water from particular sources, in the absence of any substantive source of law that expressly establishes such a duty. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-51.html

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act, the Attorney General has discretion to cancel removal of non-permanent residents who satisfy four eligibility criteria, including "that removal would result in exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" to the applicant's immediate family member who is a U.S. citizen or lawful permanent resident. 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(b)(l)(D). Congress stripped courts of jurisdiction to review cancellation-of-removal determinations, 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), but expressly preserved their jurisdiction to review "questions of law." Id. § 1252(a)(2)(D). And as this Court has already held, this "statutory phrase 'questions of law' includes the application of a legal standard to undisputed or established facts"—that is, a "mixed question of law and fact." Guerrero- Lasprilla u. Barr, 140 S. Ct. 1062, 1068-69 (2020). The question presented is whether an agency determination that a given set of established facts does not rise to the statutory standard of "exceptional and extremely unusual hardship" is a mixed question of law and fact reviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(D), as three circuits have held, or whether this determination is a discretionary judgment call unreviewable under § 1252(a)(2)(B)(i), as the court below and two other circuits have concluded.

In Simmons v. South Carolina, 512 U.S. 154 (1994), this Court held that in cases where a capital defendant's future dangerousness is at issue, due process entitles the defendant to inform the jury that he will be ineligible for parole if not sentenced to death. For many years thereafter, the Arizona Supreme Court refused to apply Simmons. In Lynch v. Arizona, 578 U.S. 613 (2016) (per curiam), this Court summarily reversed the Arizona Supreme Court's misapplication of Simmons and confirmed that the Simmons rule applies in Arizona. This petition is brought by a capital defendant in Arizona whose conviction became final after Simmons but before Lynch. He was sentenced to death after the trial judge repeatedly denied him his right under Simmons to inform the jury that he was parole-ineligible. After this Court in Lynch applied Simmons to Arizona, he sought postconviction relief in state court seeking the relief that Simmons and Lynch require. The Arizona Supreme Court denied his claim. Although Arizona provides a forum for federal constitutional claims on collateral review, and although the Arizona Supreme Court recognized that Lynch "was dictated by" Simmons, the court concluded that the rule of Lynch should not apply to cases pending on collateral review. This petition presents the question whether this Court's decision in Lynch applied a settled rule of federal law that must be applied to cases pending on collateral review in Arizona. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-846.html

May New Jersey unilaterally withdraw from the waterfront commission compact? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o156.html

(1) whether respondents have Article III standing, and (2) whether the plan exceeds the Secretary’s statutory authority or is arbitrary and capricious. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-506.html

In determining whether the Due Process Clause requires a state or local government to provide a post seizure probable cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should district courts apply the "speedy trial" test employed in United States v. $8,850, 461 U.S. 555 (1983) and Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514 (1972), as held by the Eleventh Circuit or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976) as held by at least the Second, Fifth, Seventh, and Ninth Circuits.

Whether the Bankruptcy Code expresses unequivocally Congress's intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indian tribes.

Did the Colorado Supreme Court err in ordering President Trump excluded from the 2024 presidential primary ballot?

Whether the proper remedy for the government's failure to prove venue is an acquittal barring re-prosecution of the offense, as the Fifth and Eighth Circuits have held, or whether instead the government may re-try the defendant for the same offense in a different venue, as the Sixth, Ninth, Tenth, and Eleventh Circuits have held. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1576.html

The "safety valve" provision of the federal sentencing statute requires a district court to ignore any statutory mandatory minimum and instead follow the Sentencing Guidelines if a defendant was convicted of certain nonviolent drug crimes and can meet five sets of criteria. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1)-(5). Congress amended the first set of criteria, in§ 3553(f)(1), in the First Step Act of 2018, Pub. L. No. 115-391, § 402, 132 Stat. 5194, 5221, broad criminal justice and sentencing reform legislation designed to provide a second chance for nonviolent offenders. A defendant satisfies § 3553(f)(1), as amended, if he "does not have-(A) more than 4 criminal history points, excluding any criminal history points resulting from a 1-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; (B) a prior 3-point offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines; and (C) a prior 2-point violent offense, as determined under the sentencing guidelines." 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) (emphasis added). The question presented is whether the "and" in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) means "and," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3-point offense, and (C) a 2-point offense (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the "and" means "or," so that a defendant satisfies the provision so long as he does not have (A) more than 4 criminal history points, (B) a 3- point offense, or (C) a 2-point violent offense (as the Seventh and Eighth Circuits hold). ORDER OF 10/2/2023: THE MOTION OF PETITIONER FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED FURTHER HEREIN IN FORMA PAUPERIS AND FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL IS GRANTED. J. ROBERT BLACK, OF OMAHA, NEBRASKA, IS APPOINTED TO SERVE AS COUNSEL FOR THE PETITIONER IN THIS CASE.

The three-judge district court never mentioned the presumption of the South Carolina General Assembly's good faith, analyzed Congressional District 1 as a whole, or examined the intent of the General Assembly as a whole. It also disregarded the publicly available election data used to draw District 1 and legislator testimony demonstrating that politics and traditional districting principles better explain District 1 than race. And it never identified an alternative map that achieved the General Assembly's political objectives while similarly adhering to traditional criteria. The court nonetheless held that a portion of District 1 is racially gerrymandered and discriminatory, and therefore permanently enjoined elections there. After an eight- day trial featuring more than twenty witnesses and hundreds of exhibits, the court rested this holding on its brief questioning of the experienced nonpartisan map drawer and its conclusion that he used a racial target as a proxy for politics in District 1. Plaintiffs did not pursue that theory at trial, and the court never explained why the General Assembly would use race as a proxy to draw lines for political reasons when it could (and did) use election data directly to do the job. The questions presented are: 1. Did the district court err when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze District 1 and the General Assembly's intent? 2. Did the district court err in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement m this circumstantial case? 3. Did the district court err when it failed to disentangle race from politics? 4. Did the district court err in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District l's compliance with traditional districting principles? 5. Did the district court clearly err in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data? 6. Did the district court err in upholding the intentional discrimination claim when it never even considered whether-let alone found that-District 1 has a discriminatory effect?

Section 1052(c) of Title 15 provides in pertinent part that a trademark shall be refused registration if it "[c]onsists of or comprises a name * * * identifying a particular living individual except by his written consent." 15 U.S.C. 1052(c). The question presented is as follows: Whether the refusal to register a mark under Section 1052(c) violates the Free Speech Clause of the First Amendment when the mark contains criticism of a government official or public figure.

May an individual be subject to liability for the fraud of another that is barred from discharge in bankruptcy under 11 U.S.C. (the "Bankruptcy Code") § 523(a)(2)(A), by imputation, without any act, omission, intent or knowledge of her own? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-908.html

Whether a federal district court has jurisdiction to hear a suit in which the respondent in an ongoing Securities and Exchange Commission administrative proceeding seeks to enjoin that proceeding, based on an alleged constitutional defect in the statutory provisions that govern the removal of the administrative law judge who will conduct the proceeding. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1239.html

After the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied her application for withholding of removal, petitioner Leon Santos-Zacaria filed a petition for review. Although the government agreed that the court had jurisdiction, the Fifth Circuit sua sponte dismissed in part for lack of jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1), which requires a noncitizen to exhaust "all administrative remedies available to the alien as of right." This holding implicates two circuit splits, each of which independently warrants review. 1. Eight circuits hold that Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional. Two circuits disagree, holding that exhaustion may be waived. Multiple courts and judges have called for further review of this issue. The first question presented is: Whether Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional, or merely a mandatory claims processing rule that may be waived or forfeited. 2. Further, petitioner's merits argument is that the BIA engaged in impermissible fact finding. In these circumstances, the Fifth Circuit, along with three other circuits, requires a noncitizen to file a motion to reopen or reconsider with the agency in order to satisfy Section 1252(d)(1)'s requirement that a noncitizen exhaust "remedies available * * * as of right." Two other circuits, recognizing that "[t]he decision to grant or deny a motion to reopen or reconsider is within the discretion of the Board" (8 C.F.R. § 1003.2) disagree. The second question presented is: Whether, to satisfy Section 1252(d)(1)'s exhaustion requirement, a noncitizen who challenges a new error introduced by the BIA must first ask the agency to exercise its discretion to reopen or reconsider. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1436.html

In RJR Nabisco, this Court, applying the presumption against extraterritoriality, held that a civil RICO plaintiff states a cognizable claim under RICO's private right of action only if it alleges a "domestic"-not foreign-injury. 579 U.S. 325, 354 (2016). The Court left unresolved, however, what legal test determines whether an injury is foreign or domestic. Id. ("[D]isputes may arise as to whether a particular alleged in- jury is 'foreign' or 'domestic.' But we need not concern ourselves with that question in this case."). Since RJR Nabisco, the Courts of Appeals have divided three ways as to the proper legal test for assessing whether a foreign plaintiff suffers a "domestic" injury to intangible property-such as court judgments, arbitration awards, contract rights, patents, and business reputation or goodwill. The question presented is: Does a foreign plaintiff state a cognizable civil RICO claim when it suffers an injury to intangible property, and if so, under what circumstances. In RJR Nabisco, Inc. v. European Community, 579 U.S. 325 (2016), this Court held that a plaintiff proceeding under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq., must plead and prove a "domestic" injury to maintain a claim in U.S. court. Following RJR Nabisco, the courts of appeals have split on the issue of where a foreign plaintiff suffers its injury to its intangible property for purposes of the domestic-injury inquiry. On one hand, the Seventh Circuit correctly holds that the foreign plaintiff suffers its injury abroad. On the other, the court below and Third Circuit have adopted an open-ended balancing test to determine the location of the plaintiff’s injury. Incorrectly applying that standardless test in reference to defendants' conduct, the Ninth Circuit held below that the plaintiff had suffered a domestic injury, even though he is a foreign resident with no alleged connection to the U.S. The question presented therefore is: Whether a foreign plaintiff with no alleged connection to the United States may nevertheless allege a "domestic" injury under RJR Nabisco sufficient to maintain a RICO action based only on injury to intangible property.

After petitioner acquired an essentially insolvent competitor, it found itself subjected to the review of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), rather than the Department of Justice (DOJ). While the DOJ route promises early access to judicial review, the FTC track is an altogether different matter. Petitioner faced a series of unreasonable demands from the FTC, and the prospect of “litigating” before administrative law judges insulated by unconstitutional double- for-cause removal restrictions and subject to review by an unaccountable Commission. Rather than resign itself to the ongoing unconstitutional injuries inflicted by the FTC’s process, petitioner filed suit in district court seeking to enjoin the unconstitutional FTC proceedings. That lawsuit focused on constitutional issues collateral to the underlying antitrust issues, but the district court nonetheless dismissed it for want of jurisdiction based on implications drawn from a statutory grant of jurisdiction to review the FTC’s cease-and-desist orders. A divided Ninth Circuit affirmed, with the majority acknowledging that dismissal “makes little sense,” and the dissent contending that dismissal contradicted this Court’s precedents. The questions presented are: 1. Whether Congress impliedly stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedures, and existence by granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction to “affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside” the Commission’s cease-and-desist orders. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-86.html 2. Whether, on the merits, the structure of the Federal Trade Commission, including the dual-layer for-cause removal protections afforded its administrative law judges, is consistent with the Constitution.

Respondent was a supervisor on Helix's offshore vessels and was compensated commensurate with his high-ranking position. Every two weeks, Helix paid Respondent at least $963 for each day that he worked. In all, Respondent earned $248,053 in 2015, $218,863 in 2016, and $143,680 in the eight months he worked for Helix in 2017. After his performance- related release, Respondent sued Helix under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), claiming that he was also entitled to substantially more in retroactive overtime pay. The FLSA sensibly exempts many highly compensated supervisors from the Act's overtime requirements. Specifically, employees who perform executive duties, earn at least $100,000 per year, and receive at least $455 per week paid on a salary basis are "deemed exempt." 29 C.F.R. §541.601(a). It is undisputed that Respondent performed executive duties and met the annual earnings threshold. Nevertheless, a sharply divided en banc Fifth Circuit ruled that Respondent was non-exempt and entitled to retroactive overtime pay because he was paid based on a daily rate, not a weekly rate, even though his daily rate was more than twice the weekly minimum. The majority reached that counterintuitive conclusion only by applying a separate provision, 29 C.F.R. §541.604, that the First and Second Circuits have both held inapplicable when determining whether highly compensated employees are exempt. The question presented is: Whether a supervisor making over $200,000 each year is entitled to overtime pay because the standalone regulatory exemption set forth in 29 C.F.R. §541.601 remains subject to the detailed requirements of 29 C.F.R. §541.604 when determining whether highly compensated supervisors are exempt from the FLSA's overtime-pay requirements. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-984.html

Petitioners Michael and Chantell Sackett own a vacant lot in a mostly built-out residential subdivision near Priest Lake, Idaho. The lot has no surface water connection to any body of water. In April, 2007, with local permits in hand, the Sacketts began building a family home. But later that year, Respondent Environmental Protection Agency sent them an administrative compliance order determining that their home construction violated the Clean Water Act because their lot contains wetlands that qualify as regulated "navigable waters." In Rapanos v. United States, 54 7 U.S. 715 (2006), the Court held that the Clean Water Act does not regulate all wetlands, but no opinion explaining why that is so garnered a majority of the Court. A plurality opinion authored by Justice Scalia and joined by three other Justices argued that only those wetlands that have a continuous surface water connection to regulated waters may themselves be regulated. A concurring opinion by Justice Kennedy advanced a different and much broader test, allowing for regulation of wetlands regardless of any surface connection, so long as the wetlands bear an (undefined) "significant nexus" with traditional navigable waters. Below, the Ninth Circuit employed Justice Kennedy's "significant nexus" test to uphold EPA's authority over the Sacketts' homesite. The question presented is: Should Rapanos be revisited to adopt the plurality's test for wetlands jurisdiction under the Clean Water Act? https://www.supremecourt.gov/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-454.html

Whether the federal criminal prohibition against encouraging or inducing unlawful immigration for commercial advantage or private financial gain, in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1324(a)(1)(A)(iv) and (B)(i), is facially unconstitutional on First Amendment overbreadth grounds. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-179.html

Under§ 16(a) of the Federal Arbitration Act, when a district court denies a motion to compel arbitration, the party seeking arbitration may file an immediate interlocutory appeal. This Court has held that an appeal "divests the district court of its control over those aspects of the case involved in the appeal." Griggs v. Provident Consumer Disc. Co., 459 U.S. 56, 58 (1982) (per curiam). The question presented is: Does a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration oust a district court's jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal, as the Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have held, or does the district court retain discretion to proceed with litigation while the appeal is pending, as the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-105.html

Whether admitting a codefendant's redacted out-of-court confession that immediately inculpates a defendant based on the surrounding context violates the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth Amendment. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-196.html

Does a private citizen who holds no elected office or government employment, but has informal political or other influence over governmental decisionmaking, owe a fiduciary duty to the general public such that he can be convicted of honest-services fraud? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1158.html

This case presents a clear, recognized, and intractable conflict regarding an important statutory question under the False Claims Act (FCA), 31 U.S.C. 3729-3733. When a relator files a qui tam action, the FCA puts the government to an initial choice: it "shall" either "(A) proceed with the action, in which case the action shall be conducted by the Government; or (B) notify the court that it declines to take over the action, in which case the person bringing the action shall have the right to conduct the action." 31 U.S.C. 3730(b)(4). The FCA then specifies the "Rights of the Parties to the Qui Tam Action[]" based on the government's initial choice. This case involves the government's dismissal authority under 31 U.S.C. 3730(c)(2)(A). The courts are sharply divided over whether, and when, the government can invoke this authority and dismiss a relator's FCA case after initially "declin[ing] to take over the action." The Seventh Circuit below held that the government could dismiss the case if it first intervenes and then satisfies Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)'s general standard. Other circuits expressly disagree on every single part of that determination. The question presented is: Whether the government has authority to dismiss an FCA suit after initially declining to proceed with the action, and what standard applies if the government has that authority. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1052.html

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 makes it unlawful for an employer "to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual" with respect to "compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(l). The Eighth Circuit below followed binding circuit precedent to hold that discriminatory job transfers (and denials of requested transfers) are lawful under Title VII when they do not impose "materially significant disadvantages" on employees. The question presented is: Does Title VII prohibit discrimination as to all "terms, conditions, or privileges of employment," or is its reach limited to discriminatory employer conduct that courts determine causes materially significant disadvantages for employees? THE PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI IS GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: DOES TITLE VII PROHIBIT DISCRIMINATION IN TRANSFER DECISIONS ABSENT A SEPARATE COURT DETERMINATION THAT THE TRANSFER DECISION CAUSED A SIGNIFICANT DISADVANTAGE?

Does a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act "tester" have Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation's failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation?

District courts have discretion to impose either consecutive or concurrent sentences unless a statute mandates otherwise. 18 U.S.C. § 3584(a). Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii) of Title 18 includes such a mandate, but only for sentences imposed "under this subsection." Efrain Lora was convicted and sentenced under a different subsection, Section 924(j), which does not include such a mandate. Lora therefore argued that the district court had discretion to impose concurrent sentences because Section 924(j) creates a separate offense not subject to Section 924(c)(l)(D)(ii); yet the Second Circuit ruled that the district court was required to impose consecutive sentences because Section 924(j) counts as "under" Section 924(c). This Court, however, has held that provisions like Sections 924(c) and 924(j) define separate offenses, not the same offense, because they set forth different potential punishments based on different elements. Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S. 99, 100 (2013). Four circuit courts have agreed with the Second Circuit's conclusion, although for distinct reasons (the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth). At least two circuits have disagreed (the Tenth and Eleventh). In addition to the numerous appellate decisions, this issue recurs in district courts frequently, because Section 924 is one of the most frequently charged federal criminal statutes. The question presented is: Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(l)(D)(ii), which provides that "no term of imprisonment imposed ... under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment," is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-49.html

This case presents a direct and acknowledged conflict regarding an important question of statutory construction under the Bank Secrecy Act, 31 U.S.C. 5311 et seq., which generally requires taxpayers to report their interests in foreign bank accounts. Under the Act, Congress instructed the Treasury Secretary to ''require a resident or citizen of the United States * * * to keep records, file reports, or keep records and file reports, when the * * * person makes a transaction or maintains a relation for any person with a foreign financial agency." 31 U.S.C. 5314(a). The Secretary's corresponding regulations require filing a single annual report (called an "FBAR") for anyone with an aggregate balance over $10,000 in foreign accounts. 31 C.F.R. 1010.350(a), 1010.306(c). The Act authorizes a $10,000 maximum penalty for any non-willful violation of Section 5314. See 31 U.S.C. 5321(a)(5)(A)-(B). In the decision below, the Fifth Circuit held that there is a separate violation (with its own $10,000 penalty) for each foreign account not timely reported on an annual FBAR; it thus authorized a penalty on "a per-account, not a per-form, basis." In so holding, the Fifth Circuit expressly rejected a contrary decision of the Ninth Circuit, which held the failure to file an annual FBAR constitutes a single violation, "no matter the number of accounts." This critical issue arises all the time, and the Act's penalties for identically situated parties will now turn on whether the taxpayer is from California or Texas. The question presented is: Whether a "violation" under the Act is the failure to file an annual FBAR (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or whether there is a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1195.html

Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act of 1978 (ICWA), 25 U.S.C. 1901 et seq., "to protect the best interests of Indian children and to promote the stability and security of Indian tribes and families." 25 U.S.C. 1902. The provisions of 25 U.S.C. 1912 establish minimum federal standards for the removal of Indian children from their families, while 25 U.S.C. 1915(a) and (b) establish default preferences for the placement of such children in adoptive or foster homes. The statute also contains several recordkeeping provisions. See 25 U.S.C. 1915(e), 1951(a). Three States and seven individuals brought suit, asserting that these and other ICWA provisions are facially unconstitutional. The district court agreed and granted declaratory relief. The en banc court of appeals rejected most of the plaintiffs' challenges, but affirmed, in some respects by an equally divided vote, the judgment declaring the foregoing provisions invalid. The questions presented are: 1. Whether various provisions of ICWA-namely, the minimum standards of Section 1912(a), (d), (e), and (f); the placement-preference provisions of Section 1915 (a) and (b); and the recordkeeping provisions of Sections 1915(e) and 1951(a)-violate the anticommandeering doctrine of the Tenth Amendment. 2. Whether the individual plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge ICWA’s placement preferences for "other Indian families," 25 U.S.C. 1915(a)(3), and for "Indian foster home[s]," 25 U.S.C. 1915(b)(iii). 3. Whether Section 1915(a)(3) and (b)(iii) are rationally related to legitimate governmental interests and therefore consistent with equal protection. CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-377, 21-378 AND 21-380 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-376.html

Section 11 of the Securities Act of 1933 permits suits alleging misrepresentations in a registration statement only if the plaintiffs "acquir[ed] such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77k(a). Section 12(a)(2) of the Act provides that someone who "offers or sells a security ... by means of a prospectus" may be liable for misstatements in that prospectus "to the person purchasing such security." 15 U.S.C. § 77l(a)(2). For more than 50 years, every court of appeals to consider the question has held that "such security" in Section 11 means a share registered under the registration statement the plaintiffs claim is misleading. And this Court has held that Section 12 (a)(2) applies only when there is an obligation to distribute a prospectus-an obligation that exists only for registered shares. Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., 513 U.S. 561, 584 (1995); 15 U.S.C. §§ 77d, 77e. Departing from that well-established law, a divided panel of the Ninth Circuit read "such security" to mean any share, registered or unregistered, and held that plaintiffs suing under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) need not prove that they bought registered shares. The question presented is: Whether Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 require plaintiffs to plead and prove that they bought shares registered under the registration statement they claim is misleading.

Section 112 of the Patent Act provides that a patent's "specification shall contain a written description of the invention, and of the manner and process of making and using it," sufficient "to enable any person skilled in the art * * * to make and use the" invention. 35 U.S.C. § 112(a). The requirement that the specification teach skilled artisans "to make and use" the invention is referred to as the "'enablement'" requirement. Markman v. Westview Instruments, Inc., 517 U.S. 370, 379 (1996). The questions presented are: 1. Whether enablement is "a question of fact to be determined by the jury," Wood v. Underhill, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 1, 4 (1846), as this Court has held, or "a question of law that [the court] review[s] without deference," Pet. App. 6a, as the Federal Circuit holds. 2. Whether enablement is governed by the statutory requirement that the specification teach those skilled in the art to "make and use" the claimed invention, 35 U.S.C. § 112, or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art "to reach the full scope of claimed embodiments" without undue experimentation-i.e., to cumulatively identify and make all or nearly all embodiments of the invention without substantial "'time and effort,'" Pet.App. 14a (emphasis added). LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-757.html

In Skinner v. Switzer, 562 U.S. 521, 524-25 (2011), this Court held that state prisoners may pursue post-conviction claims for DNA testing of crime-scene evidence in a civil rights action under 42 U.S.C.§ 1983. The Court made clear that a prisoner bringing such a § 1983 claim may seek "to show that the governing state law denies him procedural due process" after he has unsuccessfully sought DNA testing under available state procedures. Id. at 525, 530. The question presented is whether the statute of limitations for a § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begins to run at the end of state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including any appeals (as the Eleventh Circuit has held), or whether it begins to run at the moment the state trial court denies DNA testing, despite any subsequent appeal (as the Fifth Circuit, joining the Seventh Circuit, held below). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-442.html

The Internal Revenue Code generally requires the IRS, when it serves a summons on a third-party recordkeeper for records pertaining to a person "identified in the summons," to give that identified person notice of the summons. I.R.C. § 7609(a)(l). If the IRS issues a summons directing a bank to produce an accountholder's records, for example, it must generally notify that accountholder of the summons. Section 7609 then provides that "any person who is entitled to notice of a summons under subsection (a) shall have the right to begin a proceeding to quash" that summons in district court. Id. § 7609(b)(2); see id. § 7609(h) (l). In other words, only a person entitled to notice of a summons can seek judicial review of that summons. There are a few exceptions to the notice requirement. As relevant here, the IRS need not provide notice of "any summons ... issued in aid of the collection of (i) an assessment made or judgment rendered against the person with respect to whose liability the summons is issued; or (ii) the liability at law or in equity of any transferee or fiduciary of any person referred to in clause (i)." Id. § 7609(c)(2)(D). The question presented is whether the § 7609(c)(2)(D)(i) exception applies only when the delinquent taxpayer owns or has a legal interest in the summonsed records (as the Ninth Circuit holds), or whether the exception applies to a summons for anyone's records whenever the IRS thinks that person's records might somehow help it collect a delinquent taxpayer's liability (as the Sixth Circuit, joining the Seventh Circuit, held below). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1599.html

The Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 protects whistleblowers who report financial wrongdoing at publicly traded companies. 18 U.S.C. § 1514A. When a whistleblower invokes the Act and claims he was fired because of his report, his claim is "governed by the legal burdens of proof set forth in section 42121(b) of title 49, United States Code." 18 U.S.C. § 1514A(b)(2)(C). Under that incorporated framework, a whistleblowing employee meets his burden by showing that his protected activity "was a contributing factor in the unfavorable personnel action alleged in the complaint." 49 U.S.C. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iii). If the employee meets that burden, the employer can prevail only if it "demonstrates by clear and convincing evidence that the employer would have taken the same unfavorable personnel action in the absence of that behavior." Id. § 42121(b)(2)(B)(iv). The Question Presented is: Under the burden-shifting framework that governs Sarbanes-Oxley cases, must a whistleblower prove his employer acted with a "retaliatory intent" as part of his case in chief, or is the lack of "retaliatory intent" part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof?

Whether a communication involving both legal and non-legal advice is protected by attorney-client privilege where obtaining or providing legal advice was one of the significant purposes behind the communication. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1397.html

Under the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA), a noncitizen who is convicted of an "aggravated felony" is subject to mandatory removal and faces enhanced criminal liability in certain circumstances. One aggravated felony is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice." 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a state offense-like petitioner's accessory-after-the-fact offense here- that does not involve interference with an existing official proceeding or investigation may constitute an "offense relating to obstruction of justice." 2. Whether, assuming that the phrase "offense relating to obstruction of justice" is deemed ambiguous, courts should afford Chevron deference to the Board of Immigration Appeals' interpretation of that phrase. THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-331 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT Whether dissuading a witness from reporting a crime, in violation of California law, is "an offense relating to obstruction of justice," 8 U.S.C. 110l(a)(43)(S). THE PETITIONS FOR WRITS OF CERTIORARI ARE GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: TO QUALIFY AS “AN OFFENSE RELATING TO OBSTRUCTION OF JUSTICE,” 8 U.S.C. §1101(a)(43)(S), MUST A PREDICATE OFFENSE REQUIRE A NEXUS WITH A PENDING OR ONGOING INVESTIGATION OR JUDICIAL PROCEEDING? CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-23 FOR ONE ORAL ARGUMENT.

It is a bedrock principle of federalism that a statute does not abrogate sovereign immunity unless Congress's intent to abrogate is "unmistakably clear'' in the statutory text. Dellmuth v. Muth, 491 U.S. 223, 228 (1989). This Court and each of the other Circuits have held that a statute granting the federal courts jurisdiction over a category of claims without expressly addressing sovereign immunity does not abrogate. See, e.g., Blatchford v. Native Vill. of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 786 & n.4 (1991). The First Circuit nevertheless held, over a vigorous dissent, that 48 U.S.C. § 2126 (a) of the Puerto Rico Oversight, Management, and Economic Stability Act (PROMESA)-which grants federal jurisdiction over claims against the Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico and claims otherwise arising out of PROMESA, but says nothing about abrogation-eliminates the Board's immunity in its totality. While acknowledging that the statutory language "may not be as precise" as other instances of abrogation, the court held that certain provisions "impl[y]" that result. It did so even though jurisdiction was necessary for those claims not subject to immunity. The Question Presented is: Does 48 U.S.C.§ 2126(a)'s general grant of jurisdiction to the federal courts over claims against the Board and claims otherwise arising under PROMESA abrogate the Board's sovereign immunity with respect to all federal and territorial claims? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-96.html

This Court has repeatedly made clear that a work of art is "transformative" for purposes of fair use under the Copyright Act if it conveys a different "meaning or message" from its source material. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 510 U.S. 569, 579 (1994); Google LLC v. Oracle Am., Inc., 141 8. Ct. 1183, 1202 (2021). In the decision below, the Second Circuit nonetheless held that a court is in fact forbidden from trying to "ascertain the intent behind or meaning of the works at issue." App. 22a-23a. Instead, the court concluded that even where a new work indisputably conveys a distinct meaning or message, the work is not transformative if it "recognizably deriv[es] from, and retain[s] the essential elements of, its source material." Id. at 24a. The question presented is: Whether a work of art is "transformative" when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material (as this Court, the Ninth Circuit, and other courts of appeals have held), or whether a court is forbidden from considering the meaning of the accused work where it "recognizably deriv[es] from" its source material (as the Second Circuit has held). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-869.html

CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-1087 FOR ONE HOUR ARGUMENT. THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THESE CASES IS: WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURTS IN THESE CASES CORRECTLY FOUND A VIOLATION OF SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 52 U. S. C. §10301. ORDER OF 3/21/2022: UPON CONSIDERATION OF THE MOTION TO MODIFY OR AMEND THE QUESTION PRESENTED, THE QUESTION PRESENTED IN THESE CASES IS AMENDED AS FOLLOWS: WHETHER THE STATE OF ALABAMA’S 2021 REDISTRICTING PLAN FOR ITS SEVEN SEATS IN THE UNITED STATES HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES VIOLATED SECTION 2 OF THE VOTING RIGHTS ACT, 52 U. S. C. §10301.21. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1086.html

Under 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1), "[t]he effective date of an award of disability compensation to a veteran shall be the day following the date of the veteran's discharge or release if application therefor is received within one year from such date of discharge or release." (emphasis added.) Veterans who miss this one-year statutory deadline-even if because of a service-connected physical or mental impairment- are barred from recovering retroactive disability benefits reaching back to their date of discharge. In Irwin, this Court held that "the same rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling applicable to suits against private defendants should also apply to suits against the United States." Irwin v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, 498 U.S. 89, 95-96 (1990). Despite this, an "equally divided" Federal Circuit held 6-6 that military veterans are categorically precluded from pursuing equitable tolling of § 5110(b)(1)'s one-year deadline, regardless of the facts and circumstances of their individual cases. The questions presented are: · · (1) Does Irwin's rebuttable presumption of equitable tolling apply to the one- year statutory deadline in 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) for seeking retroactive disability benefits, and, if so, has the Government rebutted that presumption? (2) If 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) is amenable to equitable tolling, should this case be remanded so the agency can consider the particular facts and circumstances in the first instance? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-432.html

1. Whether statutory provisions that empower the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) to initiate and adjudicate administrative enforcement proceedings seeking civil penalties violate the Seventh Amendment. 2. Whether statutory provisions that authorize the SEC to choose to enforce the securities laws through an agency adjudication instead of filing a district court action violate the nondelegation doctrine. 3. Whether Congress violated Article II by granting for-cause removal protection to administrative law judges in agencies whose heads enjoy for-cause removal protection.

Proposition 12 bans the sale of pork in California unless the sow from which it derived was housed with space allowances that almost no farms satisfy (for good reason). Californians account for 13% of the Nation's pork consumption, but raise hardly any pigs. The massive costs of complying with Proposition 12 fall almost exclusively on out-of-state farmers. And because a single pig is processed into cuts that are sold nationwide in response to demand, those costs will be passed on to consumers everywhere, in countless transactions having nothing to do with California. The Ninth Circuit acknowledged that petitioners plausibly allege that Proposition 12 has "dramatic upstream effects," requires "pervasive changes to the pork production industry nationwide," and imposes costs that "mostly fall on non-California transactions." Nevertheless- in conflict with other circuits and contrary to the views of amici the United States, 20 States, and business groups-it held that petitioners failed to plead a dormant Commerce Clause violation. In doing so, it brushed aside this Court's decisions holding that laws with significant extraterritorial effects violate our federalist scheme, and failed to engage in meaningful balancing under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. The questions presented are: Whether allegations that a state law has dramatic economic effects largely outside of the state and requires pervasive changes to an integrated nationwide industry state a violation of the dormant Commerce Clause, or whether the extraterritoriality principle described in this Court's decisions is now a dead letter. Whether such allegations, concerning a law that is based solely on preferences regarding out-of-state housing of farm animals, state a Pike claim. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-468.html

Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 generally prohibits an employer from discriminating against an individual "because of such individual's * * * religion." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(l), (2). The statute defines "religion" to include "all aspects of religious observance and practice, as well as belief, unless an employer demonstrates that he is unable to reasonably accommodate to an employee's or prospective employee's religious observance or practice without undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business." Id. § 2000e(j). In Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977), this Court stated that an employer suffers an "undue hardship" in accommodating an employee's religious exercise whenever doing so would require the employer "to bear more than a de minimis cost." Id. at 84. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether this Court should disapprove the more-than-de-minimis-cost test for refusing Title. VII religious accommodations stated in Trans World Airlines, Inc. v. Hardison, 432 U.S. 63 (1977). Whether an employer may demonstrate "undue hardship on the conduct of the employer's business" under Title VII merely by showing that the requested accommodation burdens the employee's co-workers rather than the business itself.

Two Montana landowners filed a quiet title action seeking to resolve a dispute over the scope of an easement held by the United States that runs across their land and the federal government's duties under the easement. The District Court held that the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional, found that the landowners did not prove that their claims arose within twelve years of the lawsuit being filed, and dismissed the case. The District Court's treatment of the statute of limitations as jurisdictional-rather than a claim-processing rule- subjected the landowners to different standards for resolving the motion to dismiss, allowing the court to dismiss the case without holding a hearing to determine and resolve disputed facts. In conflict with the Seventh Circuit, the Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding the Quiet Title Act's statute of limitations is jurisdictional. The question presented is: Whether the Quiet Title Act's Statute of Limitations is a jurisdictional requirement or a claim--processing rule? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1164.html

QUESTION PRESENTED: Artist Lorie Smith is a website designer who creates original, online content consistent with her faith. She plans to (1) design wedding websites promoting her understanding of marriage, and (2) post a statement explaining that she can only speak messages consistent with her faith. But the Colorado Anti-Discrimination Act (CADA) requires her to create custom websites celebrating same-sex marriage and prohibits her statement--even though Colorado stipulates that she "work[s] with all people regardless of ... sexual orientation." App.53a, 184a. The Tenth Circuit applied strict scrutiny and astonishingly concluded that the government may, based on content and viewpoint, force Lorie to convey messages that violate her religious beliefs and restrict her from explaining her faith. The court also upheld CADA under Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), even though CADA creates a "gerrymander" where secular artists can decline to speak but religious artists cannot, meaning the government can compel its approved messages. The questions presented are: 1. Whether applying a public-accommodation law to compel an artist to speak or stay silent, contrary to the artist's sincerely held religious beliefs, violates the Free Speech or Free Exercise Clauses of the First Amendment. 2. Whether a public-accommodation law that authorizes secular but not religious exemptions is generally applicable under Smith, and if so, whether this Court should overrule Smith. GRANTED LIMITED TO THE FOLLOWING QUESTION: WHETHER APPLYING A PUBLIC-ACCOMMODATION LAW TO COMPEL AN ARTIST TO SPEAK OR STAY SILENT VIOLATES THE FREE SPEECH CLAUSE OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-476.html

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), 12 U.S.C. 5497, violates the Appropriations Clause, U.S. Const. Art. I,§ 9, Cl. 7, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the CFPB was receiving such funding.

Whether the Second Circuit's "right to control" theory of fraud-which treats the deprivation of complete and accurate information bearing on a person's economic decision as a species of property fraud- states a valid basis for liability under the federal wire fraud statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1343. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1170.html

Petitioners-all foreign nationals-were subjected to a $90 million damages award under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051 et seq., for allegedly infringing respondent's U.S. trademarks. While trademark rights are distinctly territorial, the accused sales occurred almost entirely abroad. Of approximately $90 million in sales, 97% were purely foreign: They were sales in foreign countries, by foreign sellers, to foreign customers, for use in foreign countries, that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers. The Tenth Circuit nonetheless held that the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially to all of petitioners' foreign sales. Recognizing that the circuits have splintered in this area, the Tenth Circuit adopted an expansive view that other courts, including the Fourth Circuit, have concededly rejected. Under the Tenth Circuit's view, the Lanham Act applies extraterritorially whenever foreign defendants' foreign conduct allegedly diverts foreign sales from a U.S. plaintiff. Such an effect, the court held, sufficiently affects U.S. commerce because it prevents foreign revenue from flowing into the U.S. economy. The question presented is: Whether the court of appeals erred in applying the Lanham Act extraterritorially to petitioners' foreign sales, including purely foreign sales that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers.

Whether, to establish that a statement is a "true threat" unprotected by the First Amendment, the government must show that the speaker subjectively knew or intended the threatening nature of the statement, or whether it is enough to show that an objective "reasonable person" would regard the statement as a threat of violence.

1. Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions? 2. Can a university reject a race-neutral alternative because it would change the composition of the student body, without proving that the alternative would cause a dramatic sacrifice in academic quality or the educational benefits of overall student-body diversity? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-707.html

Section 203(c)(l) of the Communications Decency Act immunizes an "interactive computer service" (such as YouTube, Google, Facebook and Twitter) for "publish[ing] ... information provided by another" "information content provider" (such as someone who posts a video on YouTube or a statement on Facebook). This is the most recent of three court of appeals' decisions regarding whether section 230(c)(l) immunizes an interactive computer service when it makes targeted recommendations of information provided by such another party. Five courts of appeals judges have concluded that section 230(c)(l) creates such immunity. Three court of appeals judges have rejected such immunity. One appellate judge has concluded only that circuit precedent precludes liability for such recommendations. The question presented is: Does section 230(c)(l) immunize interactive computer services when they make targeted recommendations of information provided by another information content provider, or only limit the liability of interactive computer services when they engage in traditional editorial functions (such as deciding whether to display or withdraw) with regard to such information? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1333.html

Under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, federal inmates can collaterally challenge their convictions on any ground cognizable on collateral review, with successive attacks limited to certain claims that indicate factual innocence or that rely on constitutional-law decisions made retroactive by this Court. 28 U.S.C. § 2255(h). 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e), however, also allows inmates to collaterally challenge their convictions outside this process through a traditional habeas action under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 whenever it "appears that the remedy by [§ 2255] motion is inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention." The question presented is whether federal inmates who did not-because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them-challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under § 2241 after this Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-857.html

THE APPLICATION FOR STAY IS ALSO TREATED AS A PETITION FOR A WRIT OF CERTIORARI BEFORE JUDGMENT, AND THE PETITION IS GRANTED. THE PARTIES ARE DIRECTED TO BRIEF AND ARGUE THE FOLLOWING QUESTIONS: (1) WHETHER RESPONDENTS HAVE ARTICLE III STANDING; AND (2) WHETHER THE DEPARTMENT’S PLAN IS STATUTORILY AUTHORIZED AND WAS ADOPTED IN A PROCEDURALLY PROPER MANNER. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-535.html

Does the National Labor Relations Act impliedly preempt a state tort claim against a union for intentionally destroying an employer's property in the course of a labor dispute? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1449.html

In Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., this Court clarified that limitations on judicial relief should not be treated as jurisdictional absent a clear statement by Congress. At least six circuits have held that 11 U .S.C. 363(m) does not limit the appellate courts' jurisdiction to review unstayed bankruptcy court sale orders, but rather limits only the remedies available in such an appeal. By its plain terms, Section 363(m) presupposes a "reversal or modification on appeal" of a sale order, and specifies only that such reversal or modification "does not affect the validity of [the] sale" to a good faith purchaser, leaving the courts free to fashion other remedies without that effect. In the present case, the Second Circuit held, to the contrary, that Section 363(m) deprived the appellate courts of jurisdiction over an appeal from a lease assignment order deemed "integral" to an already completed sale order, notwithstanding that: the sale order was not contingent on the assignment; the sale price was fixed without regard to whether the lease could be assigned; and respondent had expressly waived (in successfully opposing a stay) any argument that Section 363(m) would bar appellate review. A month later, the Fifth Circuit re-confirmed that it also treats Section 363(m) as jurisdiction-stripping. The question presented is: Whether Bankruptcy Code Section 363(m) limits the appellate courts' jurisdiction over any sale order or order deemed "integral" to a sale order, such that it is not subject to waiver, and even when a remedy could be fashioned that does not affect the validity of the sale. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1270.html

1. Does the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978, which empowers the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of federal agencies only, see 5 U.S.C. §7105(g), empower it to regulate the labor practices of state militias? 2. The second Militia Clause empowers Congress to "provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States." U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 16. Assuming the Civil Service Reform Act of 1978 permits the Federal Labor Relations Authority to regulate the labor practices of state militias, is the Act unconstitutional in its application to labor practices pertaining to militia members who are not employed in the service of the United States? LIMITED TO QUESTION 1 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1454.html

Hennepin County confiscated 93-year-old Geraldine Tyler's former home as payment for approximately $15,000 in property taxes, penalties, interest, and costs. The County sold the home for $40,000, and, consistent with a Minnesota forfeiture statute, kept all proceeds, including the $25,000 that exceeded Tyler's debt as a windfall for the public. In all states, municipalities may take real property and sell it to collect payment for property tax debts. Most states allow the government to keep only as much as it is owed; any surplus proceeds after collecting the debt belong to the former owner. But in Minnesota and a dozen other states, local governments take absolute title, extinguishing the owner's equity in exchange only for cancelling a smaller tax debt, code enforcement fine, or debt to government agencies. 1. 2. The questions presented are: Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Takings Clause? Whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt plus, interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment?

Courts have increasingly been called upon to determine whether a public official who selectively blocks access to his or her social media account has engaged in state action subject to constitutional scrutiny. To answer that question, most circuits consider a broad range of factors, including the account's appearance and purpose. But in the decision below, the court of appeals rejected the relevance of any consideration other than whether the official was performing a "duty of his office" or invoking the "authority of his office." App. 5a. The question presented is: Whether a public official's social media activity can constitute state action only if the official used the account to perform a governmental duty or under the authority of his or her office.

1. Should this Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003), and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions? 2. Title VI of the Civil Rights Act bans race-based admissions that, if done by a public university, would violate the Equal Protection Clause. Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 244, 276 n.23 (2003). Is Harvard violating Title VI by penalizing Asian-American applicants, engaging in racial balancing, overemphasizing race, and rejecting workable race-neutral alternatives? https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/20-1199.html

The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) preserves the rights of children with disabilities to bring claims under the Constitution and other federal anti-discrimination statutes, so long as they exhaust the IDEA's administrative procedures if their non-IDEA suit "seek[s] relief that is also available under [the IDEA]." 20 U.S.C. § 1415(l). In the decision below, the Sixth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of petitioner's claim under the Americans with Disabilities Act for failure to exhaust-even though that claim had been dismissed from petitioner's IDEA administrative proceedings, and even though petitioner had settled his IDEA claim with the school district to the satisfaction of all parties. The Sixth Circuit broke with eleven other circuits by holding that Section 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement is not subject to a futility exception. The Sixth Circuit also held that Section 1415(l)'s exhaustion requirement applies even when the plaintiff is seeking money damages, a remedy that is not available under the IDEA. The questions presented are: 1. Whether, and in what circumstances, courts should excuse further exhaustion of the IDEA's administrative proceedings under Section 1415(l) when such proceedings would be futile. 2. Whether Section 1415(l) requires exhaustion of a non-IDEA claim seeking money damages that are not available under the IDEA. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-887.html

The questions presented are: 1. Under federal admiralty law, what is the standard for judging the enforcement of a choice of law clause in a maritime contract? 2. Under federal admiralty law, can a choice of law clause in a maritime contract be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the "strong public policy" of the state whose law is displaced? GRANTED LIMITED TO QUESTION 2 PRESENTED BY THE PETITION.

The False Claims Act protects government programs from fraud by, inter alia, imposing civil liability on anybody who knowingly presents false claims for payment to the government or makes false statements that are material to such claims. 31 U.S.C. § 3729(a). The statute defines "knowingly" to include acting with: (1) actual knowledge; (2) deliberate ignorance; or (3) reckless disregard of the falsity of information. See id. § 3729(b)(l)(A). The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 22-111 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT. This case presents the same question as No. 21-1326, United States ex rel. Schutte v. SuperValu Inc. It also arises from the same court of appeals. The Court may wish to consider the two petitions together. The question presented is: Whether and when a defendant's contemporaneous subjective understanding or beliefs about the lawfulness of its conduct are relevant to whether it "knowingly" violated the False Claims Act. CONSOLIDATED WITH 21-1326 FOR ONE HOUR ORAL ARGUMENT

The Armed Career Criminal Act provides that felons who possess a firearm are normally subject to a maximum 10-year sentence. But if the felon already has at least three "serious drug offense" convictions, then the minimum sentence is fifteen years. Courts decide whether a prior state conviction counts as a serious drug offense using the categorical approach. That requires determining whether the elements of a state drug offense are the same as, or narrower than those of its federal counterpart. If so, the state conviction qualifies as an ACCA predicate. But federal drug law often changes-as here, where Congress decriminalized hemp, narrowing the federal definition of marijuana. If state law doesn't follow suit, sentencing courts face a categorical conundrum. Under an earlier version of federal law, the state and federal offenses match-and the state offense is an ACCA predicate. Under the amended version, the offenses do not match-and the state offense is not an ACCA predicate. So the version of federal law that the court chooses to consult dictates the difference between serving a 10-year maximum or a 15-year minimum. The question presented is: Which version of federal law should a sentencing court consult under ACCA's categorical approach? The Armed Career Criminal Act mandates fifteen years in prison for federal firearm offenses where the defendant has three prior "violent felonies" or "serious drug offenses." The ACCA defines a "serious drug offense" as "an offense under State law, involving manufacturing, distributing, or possessing with intent to manufacture or distribute, a controlled substance (as defined in section 102 of the Controlled Substances Act (21 U.S.C. 802)), for which a maximum term of imprisonment often years or more is prescribed by law." 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) (emphasis added). Four circuits have unanimously held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) incorporates the federal drug schedules in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense to which the ACCA applies. In the decision below, however, the Eleventh Circuit accepted the government's express invitation to reject those circuit decisions. In doing so, the Eleventh Circuit held that § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii) instead incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the defendant's prior state drug offense. The question presented is: Whether the "serious drug offense" definition in the Armed Career Criminal Act, 18 U.S.C. § 924(e)(2)(A)(ii), incorporates the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the federal firearm offense (as the Third, Fourth, Eighth, and Tenth Circuits have held), or the federal drug schedules that were in effect at the time of the prior state drug offense (as the Eleventh Circuit held below).1 1 A related question is presented in Altman, et al. v. United States (No. 22-5877) (response requested Nov. 16, 2022) and Brown v. United States (No. 22-6389) (docketed Dec. 23, 2022).

Whether 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(8), which prohibits the possession of firearms by persons subject to domestic-violence restraining orders, violates the Second Amendment on its face.

Under Section 2333 of the Anti-Terrorism Act, as amended by the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, U.S. nationals injured by "an act of international terrorism" that is "committed, planned, or authorized by" a designated foreign terrorist organization may sue any person who "aids and abets, by knowingly providing substantial assistance, or who conspires with the person who committed such an act of international terrorism," and recover treble damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2333(a), (d)(2). The questions presented are: 1. Whether a defendant that provides generic, widely available services to all its numerous users and "regularly" works to detect and prevent terrorists from using those services "knowingly" provided substantial assistance under Section 2333 merely because it allegedly could have taken more "meaningful" or "aggressive" action to prevent such use. 2. Whether a defendant whose generic, widely available services were not used in connection with the specific "act of international terrorism" that injured the plaintiff may be liable for aiding and abetting under Section 2333. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1496.html

Whether U.S. district courts may exercise subject-matter jurisdiction over criminal prosecutions against foreign sovereigns and their instrumentalities under 18 U.S.C. § 3231 and in light of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1441(d), 1602-1611. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1450.html

Whether the Bankruptcy Code authorizes a court to approve, as part of a plan of reorganization under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Code, a release that extinguishes claims held by nondebtors against nondebtor third parties, without the claimants’ consent.

The Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to lay "taxes on incomes ... without apportionment among the several States." Beginning with Eisner v. Macomber, 252 U.S. 189 (1920), this Court's decisions have uniformly held "income," for Sixteenth Amendment purposes, to require realization by the taxpayer. In the decision below, however, the Ninth Circuit approved taxation of a married couple on earnings that they undisputedly did not realize but were instead retained and reinvested by a corporation in which they are minority shareholders. It held that "realization of income is not a constitutional requirement" for Congress to lay an "income" tax exempt from apportionment. App.12. In so holding, the Ninth Circuit became "the first court in the country to state that an 'income tax' doesn't require that a 'taxpayer has realized income."' App.38 (Bumatay, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). The question presented is: Whether the Sixteenth Amendment authorizes Congress to tax unrealized sums without apportionment among the states.

The application for stay presented to Justice Alito and by him referred to the Court is denied. The Solicitor General suggested that the Court may want to construe the application as a petition for certiorari before judgment. Doing so, the petition is granted. The parties are directed to brief and argue the following questions: 1. Whether the state plaintiffs have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Homeland Security’s Guidelines for the Enforcement of Civil Immigration Law; 2. Whether the Guidelines are contrary to 8 U.S.C. §1226(c) or 8 U.S.C. §1231(a), or otherwise violate the Administrative Procedure Act; and 3. Whether 8 U.S.C. §1252(f)(1) prevents the entry of an order to “hold unlawful and set aside” the Guidelines under 5 U.S.C. §706(2). https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22-58.html

Whether a State's judicial branch may nullify the regulations governing the "Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives . . . prescribed . . . by the Legislature thereof," U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 1, and replace them with regulations of the state courts' own devising, based on vague state constitutional provisions purportedly vesting the state judiciary with power to prescribe whatever rules it deems appropriate to ensure a "fair" or "free" election. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/21-1271.html

EXCEPTIONS TO REPORT OF THE SPECIAL MASTER Plaintiff State of Delaware respectfully submits the following exceptions to the First Interim Report of the Special Master issued on July 23, 2021: 1. Delaware takes exception to, and this Court should decline to adopt, the Special Master’s report and recommendation to deny Delaware’s request for partial summary judgment and to grant Defendants’ request for partial summary judgment. 2. Delaware takes exception to, and this Court should decline to adopt, the components of the Special Master’s report and recommendation, including: a. The Special Master’s definition of “money order”; b. The Special Master’s definition of “third party bank check”; c. The Special Master’s definition of “other similar written instrument”; d. The other flaws discussed in the accompanying brief, which addresses these exceptions (and related errors) more fully. CONSOLIDATED WITH 146 Orig. https://www.supremecourt.gov/search.aspx?filename=/docket/docketfiles/html/public/22o145.html